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I
It Was Inevitable That Land Interests Should Have Been
Included Within the Scope of the Statute of Frauds.
The English Parliament enacted the Statute of Frauds in
1676 "for the prevention of many fraudulent practices which are
commonly endeavoured to be upheld by perjury and subor-
nation of perjury." It became effective the following year.1
These practices had become common as a result of the confusion,
turmoil, and lawlessness which had accompanied and followed
the English Civil War and the Restoration. They were peculiarly
common in those categories of transactions which were included
within the formalism prescribed by the Statute.2 Those cate-
gories related to land transactions, and to certain types of agree-
ments involving personal property.
From the beginning of the English legal order in 1066, and
even before that in the primitive period of Anglo-Saxon law,
land was considered of unique importance because it was the
basis of multiple sociological, political, and economic relation-
ships.3 Not only was land the prime source of wealth, but it
determined status in every sphere of social living.4
Accordingly, land came within the periphery of the English
legal order long before personal property. Holdsworth has writ-
ten that at the time of Bracton, who died in 1268, the law of per-
sonal property did not bulk large.5 Indeed rights in personal
property were recognized only insofar as they related to land.6
Besides, at the time of Bracton, the ecclesiastical courts were
important agencies of social control in certain matters pertaining
to personal property. 7
Prof. of Law, Loyola Univ. School of Law (New Orleans).
1 29 Car. II, c. 3; see 6 Holdsworth, A History of English Law 379-383
(1927).
2 Franklin, Marc A., Contracts: Statute of Frauds: Law Reform (Enforce-
ment of Contracts) Act, 1954, 2 and 3 Eliz. 2, c. 34, 40 Cornell L. Q. 581, 582
(1955); also, see Scott, Abridgment of the Law of Trusts 96 (1960).
3 2 Holdsworth, op. cit. supra n. 1 at 260 (1927).
4 Id. at 264.
5 Id. at 265.
6 Id. at 265-266.
7 Id. at 266.
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Because of its uniqueness, some kind of formalism had al-
ways been a condition precedent for the recognition of land
transactions in English law. Blackstone has shown how the trans-
fer of title to land had always required form among "all well-
governed nations." 8
In the middle ages, formalism as to land included livery of
seisin by which there was a "feudal investiture, or delivery of
corporeal possession of the land or tenements." 9 This was abso-
lutely necessary to complete the transfer of the interest in land. °
As in all instances of legal formalism, the purpose was "the need
of assurance of the existence of operative facts." "
The Statute of Frauds was an important landmark in the
evolution of land formalism. It added the requirement of signed
writing for which a livery of seisin could not be substituted. 12
Three general categories of land transactions were included in
the Statute, namely, first, certain transfers of important legal
interests in land, either inter vivos 13 or testamentary;' 4 secondly,
declarations or assignments of equitable interests, i.e. express
trusts of land;15 and thirdly, contracts or sales of any lands, tene-
ments, or hereditaments or any interests in or concerning them.16
In the first category, it was enacted that all leases, estates,
and interests in freehold, or terms of years, or any uncertain
interest in land (other than leases not exceeding three years at a
rent of two-thirds the full value) which are not put in writing
and signed by the parties or agents, lawfully authorized by writ-
ing, will have the force only of estates at will. 17 The same formal-
ism was required in instances of assignments and surrenders of
such interests.'8 Besides, wills of real estate must be in writing,
signed by the testator, or by some other person in his presence
and by his direction, and attested in his presence by three or four
8 2 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 312 (1766).
9 Id. at 311.
10 Ibid.
1 4 Pound, Jurisprudence 431 (1959).
12 6 Holdsworth, op. cit. supra n. 1 at 397.
13 §§1-3.
14 §§ 5, 6.
15 §7.
16 § 4(4).
'7 § 1.
18 6 Holdsworth, op. cit. supra n. 1 at 384-385.
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credible witnesses. 19 The same formalism was made applicable to
the revocation of such wills.
20
In the second category, it was provided that all declarations
or creations of trusts or confidences of any lands, tenements, or
hereditaments shall be "manifested and proved" by some writing,
signed by the party who is by law enabled to declare such trust,
or by his last will in writing, or else they shall be "utterly void
and of none effect." 21 But the Statute did not apply to trusts
which arose by operation of law, namely, resulting and construc-
tive trusts.2
2
In the third category, it was prescribed that no action shall
be brought upon any agreement or sale of lands, tenements, or
hereditaments, or any interest in or concerning them, unless the
agreement upon which such action shall be brought, or some
memorandum or note thereof, shall be in writing, and signed by
the party to be charged therewith, or some other person there-
unto by him lawfully authorized.2
3
Manifestly, the purpose of the formalism of the Statute was
to promote the common good by protecting the social interest in
the security of transactions and of acquisitions 24 against fraud
and deception. In this connection, its purpose was analogous to
that intended by the requirement of form as to precise words of
negotiability in the domain of bills and notes.2 5 The purpose
sought by Parliament was through a formalism prescribed by the
immediate authority of the will of the English political sovereign.
But after the American Revolutionary War, this Statute, like
other Parliamentary enactments, such as the Statute of Uses and
the Statute of Limitations, became recognized as part of the
Anglo-American common law.
The underlying principle of the Statute was accepted as rest-
ing upon the authority of right reason, and was accordingly given
imperative form by the various legislatures in the United States.
Indeed, the principal provisions of the Statute were enacted in
substantially all English-speaking jurisdictions.2 6 This was so
19 §§ 5, 6.
20 Ibid.
21 § 7. See Scott, op. cit. supra n. 2 at 95, 96.
22 §8.
23 § 4(4).
24 Pound, op. cit. supra n. 11 at 432.
25 Id. at 435.
26 Ibid.
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even though each jurisdiction had its own distinctive statutory
language, judicial interpretation, and procedural concepts. 27
II
The Common Law Courts, Dominated by the Analytical
Legal Philosophy of Hobbes, Interpreted the Formalism of the
Statute of Frauds so as to Make It Relate to the Essence of All
Land Transactions.
Apparently, the framers of the Statute did not intend that
the formalism prescribed therein for land transactions should
extend to the essence or validity of all land transactions. The
authors of the Statute knew the distinction between the con-
cepts of unenforcibility and invalidity, as shown by the fact that
they made any attempt to create a trust of land, without the
prescribed formalism, "utterly void." 28 They did not expressly
declare that an attempt to transfer a land interest, inter vivos or
testamentary, without the required formalism was void, but re-
garded it only as an estate at will,22 with the implication that
the estate intended did not legally pass to the tenant. But they
declared that an agreement for the future conveyance of land
without the signed writing was simply unenforcible, so that no
legal action might be brought.30
The clash of concepts as to what should be the legal con-
sequence of failure to comply with the formalism of the Statute
is understandable through the fact that the Statute was enacted
at the beginning of the maturity of English law. In this period,
the idea of formalism, as it existed in the era of the amoral,
strict law, up to the appearance of the Chancery Court at the
end of the fourteenth century, and the concept of formalism
which prevailed in the period of equity or natural law, up to
the latter part of the seventeenth century, were competing.
Those parts of the Statute, therefore, which made formalism re-
late to the juridical essence of the transaction were dictated by
the amoral, atavistic, surviving concept of formalism of the strict
law. The area of the Statute which made its formalism relate
to the legal enforcibility of agreements, i.e. in regard to contracts
involving land interests, was the product of such authors as
27 Franklin, op. cit. supra n. 2 at 581.
28 §7.
29 §§ 1-3.
80 § 4(4).
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Chancellor Lord Nottingham who had faith in a natural law
theory.
The Common Law Courts, dominated by the amoral, legal
philosophy of Hobbes, construed the Statute to relate the pre-
scribed form to the validity of all land transactions. They ful-
filled the intention of the framers of the Statute as to the clauses
which rendered land transfers void, but departed from that in-
tention in reference to the land contract clause. Lack of legal
enforcibility postulates the existence of an agreement binding
in the moral order. But the traditionally amoral legal philos-
ophy of the Common Law Courts did not cognize moral rights.
At Common Law, enforcibility went to the essence of a con-
tract. Enforcibility depended upon compliance with formalism,
which necessarily related to essence. A legal right without en-
forcibility is a contradiction. Of course, a person might have a
moral right which is not legally enforcible. In this case, the
agreement remained morally valid and binding, but was legally
invalid as a contract.
In the area of land contracts, the Common Law Courts con-
strued the signed writing prescribed by the Statute of Frauds
as an additional form of that of consideration.3 1 Lord Mansfield
unsuccessfully sought to bring the philosophy of natural law in-
to the judicial process. He had endeavored to make considera-
tion only evidentiary, i.e. only one possible way, albeit the best
way, to show the presence of the reason factor in any agree-
ment.32
Slade's case had been decided about seventy-five years be-
fore the enactment of the Statute of Frauds.3 3 It initiated a
Common Law doctrine of contract law, based on the formalism
of consideration. Despite the efforts of Lord Mansfield, this
formalism was held to be more than evidentiary in Rann v.
Hughes.3 4 Unless the form of consideration was present, ad-
herence to the form of the Statute of Frauds was insufficient.
Neither form was wholly instrumental, rather it was a matter
of proving compliance with form as a condition precedent. Ju-
ridicity did not depend upon the legal recognition of an already
31 Franklin, op. cit. supra n. 2 at 582.
32 8 Holdsworth, op. cit. supra n. 1 at 35, 36; also, see Brown, Brendan F.,
The Natural Law Basis of Juridical Institutions in the Anglo-American Le-
gal System, 4 Catholic Univ. L. Rev. 81, at 82, 83 (1954).
33 4 Coke 92 b, 76 Eng. Rep. 1074 (1602).
84 7 T. R. 350, 101 Eng. Rep. 1014 (1778).
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existing agreement which derived moral binding force from the
wills of the parties acting according to right reason.
When the Courts talked of the unenforcibility of a land
agreement under the Statute of Frauds, they meant that by a
judicial fiction the agreement ceased to exist de facto. A similar
thought was expressed by Jhering when he wrote that "Form is
for a legal transaction what the stamp is for a coin." 35 The
stamp makes the entity valuable, not its intrinsic worth. Of
course, he was not referring to "legal" in the sense of "equitable."
III
Chancery, Adopting a Natural Law Philosophy, Did Not Re-
late the Formalism of the Statute to the Essence of Land Trans-
actions, but Regarded It Only as Evidentiary.
Chancery was clearly bound by the letter of the law of the
Statute of Frauds which made a signed writing essential for the
transfer of legal interests of land, both inter vivos and testamen-
tary. It was also bound by Section 4 which made certain types
of agreements unenforcible at law without the required form,
except in subsection 4 which dealt with contracts involving land
interests. In regard to this subsection, Chancery was able to
assume jurisdiction, and to apply equitable principles in its in-
terpretation and evolution. This it was able to do by virtue of
the consequences of the historical fiction of land's uniqueness.
Nor was Chancery limited by the provisions which concerned
express trusts.
This fiction enabled Chancery to obtain jurisdiction over
land contracts. Since all land was irrebuttably presumed to be
unique, money damages for breach of contract would not be
sufficient remedy. Irreparable loss would result unless the con-
tract was specifically performed. But only Chancery had the
power to grant specific performance because of its natural law
emphasis upon the moral duty of the defendant to fulfill the
promise. Only Chancery could thus act in personam.
Although the Statute had declared that any attempt to
create an express trust was "utterly void" unless it was mani-
fested and proved by the prescribed formalism, Chancery in-
terpreted "void" to mean "voidable." 36 It had authority to do
35 ]12 Geist des R6mischen Rechts 494 (8th ed. 1923) cited by Fuller in
Consideration and Form, 41 Columbia L. Rev. 799, at 801 (1941).
36 Scott, op. cit. supra n. 2 at 96; Bogert, Handbook of the Law of Trusts 61(3rd ed. 1952). See also, generally, Oleck, Historical Nature of Equity Juris-
prudence, 20 Fordham L. Rev. 23 (1951).
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this because a trust was the creature of Chancery, which re-
garded all formalism as strictly evidentiary so that it did not
affect the essence of the de jure transaction.
Even the framers of the Statute realized that the form pre-
scribed by the Statute could not be made applicable to a trust
resulting by implication or construction of law. While Parlia-
ment might have abolished resulting and constructive trusts, it
could not manacle the power of Chancery to find or impose a
trust relationship by a specific formalism. These trusts arose
from the implicatory and impository authority of the equitable
judicial process. This authority was always exercised in the
light of all possible relevant evidence, and upon the postulate of
an objective order of "ought" outside the positive law.
Chancery construed the form required by the Statute as
wholly evidentiary not only in reference to trusts, but also to
contracts involving land. Various doctrines were developed in
this connection. In the first place, the Statute served no purpose
in preventing fraud, if the defendant confessed the existence
of the agreement. Here there was no possibility of perjury. It
was inescapable that the Common Law Courts under the domi-
nation of an amoral, legal philosophy should take the opposite
position. Professor Stevens has traced the decline of natural law
philosophy, even in the Chancery Court, under such Chancellors
as Loughborough in the eighteenth century and Eldon in the
nineteenth century.3 7 They held that the defendant might in-
voke the law of the Statute even though he admitted the
agreement.38 Indeed, many of the newly established American
courts unfortunately adopted the analytical philosophy of the
later Chancellors.39 Fortunately, but paradoxically, this is the
only doctrinal area in which English Chancellors adopted such a
philosophy in their interpretation of the Statute of Frauds.
Secondly, Chancery rejected the formalism of the Statute
when the defendant had fraudulently prevented an agreement
from being reduced to writing. Fraud existed when the plaintiff
had been induced to forego a signed written instrument on the
assurance that a parol understanding was sufficient. This could
be done by positive false statement or by concealment.40 Un-
37 Stevens, Robert S., Ethics and the Statute of Frauds, 37 Cornell L. Q.
355, at 356-357 (1952).
38 Id. at 369-372.
39 Id. at 372-373.
40 3 Pomeroy, A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence 429 and following (5th
ed. 1941).
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avoidable accident which has occasioned non-compliance with
the Statute was similarly treated.4 1
Thirdly, Chancery worked out the celebrated Doctrine of
Part Performance. This sprang from a natural law philosophy
which made all depend for their essence upon the wills of the
parties, acting as moral and reasonable persons. In the name of
justice, other evidence than a signed writing should be admissible
to show the factors of will and reason in an agreement, on the
presupposition that it is a moral phenomenon. Of course, the
positive law maker has the right to specify the best evidence.
Obviously, the Doctrine of Part Performance was misnamed
because the acts claimed as part performance, so as "to take the
case out of the Statute of Frauds" are not those dictated by the
assumed obligations of the oral agreement. Perhaps a more ex-
planatory title would have been the Doctrine of Judicial Impli-
cation from the Subsequent Acts of the Parties. Instead of look-
ing at those acts which took place prior to the inception of the
alleged agreement, and inferring that the parties had willed an
implied contract, the court considers those acts which took place
after the alleged agreement. It is not a question, therefore, of
implying the existence of the necessary elements required in an
agreement before the courts treat it as de jure, but rather the
existence of the agreement itself.
It is well known that if the plaintiff takes possession of the
land in question and deals with it as his own, the English courts,
and some of the American, will conclude that this "unequivo-
cally" points to the existence of the agreement. But other courts
require in addition the making of valuable improvements on the
land so that if the agreement is not made de jure and enforced,
irreparable injustice will result.42 Of course, all courts applying
the Doctrine of Part Performance agree that if the plaintiff takes
possession and also makes valuable improvements, this will be
sufficient to warrant a conclusion on the agreement's existence.43
The plaintiff acted in reliance on his right to expect the court to
enforce it. 44
It may be noted that in all these different situations, dis-
cussed above, the Chancery Court does not purport to operate
41 Id. at 620, 621; also see McClintock, Handbook of the Principles of Equity
136-147 (2d ed. 1948).
42 McClintock, op. cit. supra, n. 41, at 141.
48 Id. at 142, 143.
44 Ibid.
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on the legal interest in the property in question. Its jurisdiction
extends only to the equitable property interest. Thus if an
agreement between A and B has vested the equitable property
in A, then Chancery has authority to order B to convey the legal
interest under penalty of imprisonment for contempt if he fails
to do so.
IV
Sections of the Statute of Frauds Dealing with Land Trans-
actions Have Survived in England and Will Doubtless Continue
to Do so There and in the United States.
In addition to the sections of the Statute dealing with land
transactions, its anatomy also included a heterogeneous structure
of non-land agreements. Thus in Section 4, it was declared that
in addition to land agreements, certain other types were unen-
forcible in law unless they were evidenced by a writing signed by
the party to be charged or his duly authorized agent. These in-
cluded a special promise of an executor or administrator to an-
swer damages out of his own estate, a promise to answer for the
debt, default, or miscarriage of another, an agreement made in
consideration of marriage, and an agreement not to be per-
formed within a year from the making thereof. Section 17 pro-
vided that promises or agreements for the sale of goods, wares,
and merchandise of £10 or upwards were not "allowed to be
good" unless evidenced by either acceptance and actual receipt,
or by a gift of something as earnest, or by part payment, or by
a note or memorandum in writing signed by the parties to be
charged.
Predictions made by great legal scholars confidently looked
forward to the repeal of all or most of the non-land provisions.4 5
These predictions were fulfilled in England in 1954, when the
Law Reform (Enforcement of Contracts) Act, 2 and 3 Eliz. 2, c.
34 went into effect.46 This Statute repealed Section 4 of the Stat-
ute except the subsections relating to contracts of land and
promises to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of an-
other.47 Section 17 of the Statute of Frauds had been superseded
by Section 4 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, 56 and 57 Vict.,
c. 71. The Act of 1954 repealed this section.
45 6 Holdsworth, op. cit. supra n. 1 at 396, The Sixth Interim Report.
46 Franklin, op. cit. supra n. 2 at 518.
47 Ibid.
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The Sixth Interim Report of the 1937 English Law Revision
Committee had previously listed various reasons why the non-
land sections of the Statute should be repealed. Briefly, they
were that modern jury and evidentiary procedure had eliminated
a basic reason for the enactment of the Statute; that it defeated
just claims more often than unjust ones, encouraging evasion of
obligations; that there was no fundamental reason why only
these particular classes of agreements should be included and
not others; and finally, that these provisions were no longer re-
sponsive to contemporary business practices. The first report of
the 1953 English Law Reform Committee reiterated these rea-
sons.
48
If it were not for the difference in the status of the jury sys-
tem in England and the United States, the non-land provisions
of the Statute might well be in a precarious position in this coun-
try. One of the most important reasons for the passage of the
Statute was to establish a required formalism which would fa-
cilitate the task of the jury as a fact finder.49 But now in Eng-
land, unlike the United States, the right of trial by jury in civil
cases has practically been eliminated.50
A different historical evaluation has been given to the land
sections of the Statute. These sections were re-enacted in Eng-
land in the Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 Geo. 5, c. 20, after
first having been repealed. But these sections remained substan-
tially as they were originally in 1677. 51 It is true that much of
the satisfaction with the parts of the Statute concerning land and
contracts involving land interests has been due to the relatively
great "importance, longevity, and technicality of land transac-
tions." 52 Certainly the nature of real estate, its fixity, and its
permanence will always enjoy a unique category in the field of
property. The same is true in regard to the Roman law and the
legal systems which have been derived from it. But this satis-
48 See 15 Canadian B. Rev. 585 (1937) which contains The Sixth Interim
Report; cited by Franklin, op. cit. supra n. 2 at 585, footnote 36; see Recent
Statute, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 383 (1954).
49 6 Holdsworth, op. cit. supra n. 1 at 388.
50 Franklin, op. cit. supra n. 2 at 588.
51 See 68 Harv. L. Rev. 383 (1954). The land transfer sections, both inter
vivos and testamentary, of the Statute of Frauds, and also the trust Sections
of that Statute were reenacted in Sections 53 and 54 of the Law of Property
Act, 1925, and Subsection 4(4) of the Statute of Frauds, dealing with land
contracts, in Section 40 of the 1925 Act.
52 Id. at 384.
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faction would not have been possible without the intervention
of the natural law philosophy of the Chancery Court in making
the Statute achieve its proclaimed purpose of preventing fraud.
Without that intervention, the historical evaluation might well
have been that not only the non-land parts of the Statute, but
also its land sections, have been predominantly a sword of injus-
tice.
V
The Best Assurance of the Survival of What Remains of the
Statute of Frauds Is the Extension of the Natural Law Interpre-
tation into Newly Arising Fields of Litigation.
It is recommended that judges rely on a natural law inter-
pretation of the Statute in ruling upon the admissibility of parol
evidence; otherwise public opinion may demand the enactment
of remedial legislation. Popular dissatisfaction with judicial de-
cisions which reflect an amoral approach will certainly be great-
est when they uphold a legislative form as an end in itself.
Within the past year, an interesting and relevant case,
namely, Hayes et al. v. Muller, was decided by the Supreme
Court of Louisiana on the question of the admissibility of evi-
dence under legislative provisions analogous to those of the Stat-
ute of Frauds. 53 The facts were that A, B, and C entered into
an oral agreement of joint adventure. Each contributed an equal
sum of money for the purchase of oil, gas, and mineral leases.
These were to be bought and sold for the benefit of A, B, and C.
Pursuant to this oral agreement, a particular oil and gas lease
was obtained by C in his name only, in reliance upon confidential
information received from A and B. Six years later, C sold this
lease to D for $900,000 at an enormous profit. The basic legal
question which was certified to the Louisiana Supreme Court by
the Court of Appeal was whether A and B were permitted to use
53 158 So. 2d 191 (1963). Civil Code, Art. 2275. Every transfer of immovable
property must be in writing, but if a verbal sale, or other disposition of
such property be made, it shall be good against the vendor, as well as
against the vendee, who confesses it when interrogated on oath, provided
actual delivery has been made of the immovable.
Civil Code, Art. 2276. Neither shall parol evidence be admitted against
or beyond what is contained in the acts ....
Revised Statutes, 9:1105. Oil, gas, and other mineral leases, and con-
tracts applying to and affecting these leases . . . are classified as real rights
and incorporeal immovable property. They may be asserted, protected, and
defended in the same manner as may be the ownership or possession of
other immovable property ....
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parol evidence to prove this original agreement wherein no
claim was made against the title held by D.
A and B had alleged fraud and bad faith on the part of C
on the grounds that he had induced them to forego their formal
demand until after the transfer of the title of the property to D.
They claimed the right to specific performance of the agreement
of joint adventure for an equal division of the profits, or in the
alternative for an accounting. C's defense was that there was no
cause of action because the joint adventure agreement was only
verbal. He contended that parol evidence was inadmissible ac-
cording to the legislative provisions analogus to those of the Stat-
ute of Frauds, because this alleged agreement involved oil, gas,
and mineral leases, which by statute were incorporeal immovable
property, i.e. the equivalent of land in the civil law.
At first, the Louisiana Supreme Court, treating the case as
a direct appeal, decided for the plaintiffs. But upon a rehearing,
they stated, "It is our opinion now that we were in error in
holding originally that the plaintiffs had stated a cause of action
for an accounting of the profits realized from the alleged joint ad-
venture." 54
The judges actually adjudicated the case as Common Law
Judges rather than as Chancellors, a role which they had as-
sumed prior to the rehearing. In their previous role as Chancel-
lors, they had followed a natural law theory of legal formalism
by allowing the plaintiffs to establish a joint adventure agree-
ment, even though in some way it related to immovables. The
plaintiffs were seeking not a legal interest in an immovable, but
only in the profits from the sale of an immovable.
It was manifest from the facts that the appropriate evidence
would have been acts or activity, which if established would have
had unequivocal reference to the existence of the alleged oral
agreement. These acts might have been the confidential com-
munication of secret information as to oil and gas locations, the
contribution of specific sums of money by the parties for the com-
mon purpose, the actual buying of the leases and royalties and
the like. The evidence would have been much more than mere
sworn statements of witnesses. Such statements might well have
been the product of perjury. In this case the parol evidence was
not intended to prove that legal title to an immovable was in
54 Id. at 197.
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some one other than the person in whom a signed writing showed
it to be.
In their original role as Chancellors, the members of the
Court assumed an equitable attitude toward the formalism anal-
ogous to that of the Statute of Frauds. They seemed mindful of
the fraud which resulted from C's deceiving his associates into
believing that he was using the confidential information for all
parties. Apparently, the Court gave proper weight to the fidu-
ciary character of the relationship, which invited a high degree
of trust and reliance.
After the rehearing they abandoned a natural law philoso-
phy in favor of a strict, analytical, and inequitable approach. In
consequence of this, they held in effect that the absence of a
signed writing raised an irrebuttable presumption of the de jure
non-existence of any agreement of joint adventure.
Law and equity were separated because the Court no longer
gave any juridical effect to the bad faith and violation of a highly
fiduciary relationship. Indeed, it seems that no weight was at-
tached to the allegation that it was the practice and custom in the
oil and gas industry for joint adventurers to deal with each other
verbally, and that it was not material in whose name royalties
and leases were held since "the interest of all parties would in
due time be properly assigned." 55
The Common Law role of the Judges after the rehearing was
further manifested by a heavy reliance upon stare decisis. The
case of Emerson v. Shirley 56 was said not to be relevant as
precedent to the case at bar. Rejecting the broad legal philos-
ophy of that case upon which it relied before, the rehearing, the
Court focused on the facts to reject it because the case only in-
volved the annulment of a sale of a fractional royalty interest.
One dissenting Judge stressed: "If the joint adventure doc-
trine is a part of our law, it is so because it supplies a device to
do equity when equity is clearly due. This is a question which
the legislature has not governed by any enactment which has
been brought to my attention." 57
Article 21 of the Civil Code of Louisiana states that, "In all
civil matters, where there is no express law, the judge is bound
55 Id. at 193.
56 188 La. 196, 175 So. 909 (1937).
57 158 So. 2d. 191 at 202 (1963). Constructive Trust unavailable, see La. R.
S. § 1791, 1792 (16).
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to proceed and decide according to equity. To decide equitably,
an appeal is to be made to natural law and reason, or received
usages, where positive law is silent." Implicit in the opinion of
the dissenting Judge was the concept that this Article did not
forbid recourse to equity and natural law for the purpose of in-
terpreting civil positive law.
In the above discussion of Hayes et al. v. Muller, it has been
assumed that the Court was correct in interpreting Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:1105 to mean that verbal agreements apply-
ing to and affecting oil, gas, and mineral leases were in the same
category as those involving immovables in the sense that such
agreements were not admissible. Of course, if this interpretation
is not correct, and the legislative formalism was not intended to
relate to cases of this kind, then clearly the larger issues of the
case would not have arisen, and it would have been decided for
the plaintiff.
Conclusion
To the extent that the Chancellor's role is abandoned in
favor of that of the Common Law Judge with respect to the in-
terpretation of the Statute of Frauds, the likelihood of legislative
intervention will grow. The method of remedial legislation would
be unfortunate and undesirable since equity has always better
been applied internally in a legal system through the judicial
process, rather than externally by the authority of legislation.
But legislative intervention would be the lesser of two evils. The
greater judicial evil would be a return to the period of the
strict law when legal forms were used as monopolistic mecha-
nisms for the determining of legal consequences.
May, 1964
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